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THE PRIVACY COST OF CURRENCY
Karin Thrasher*

I. INTRODUCTION
Most central banks issue two types of money: banknotes and reserve
1
deposits. Banknotes, or cash, can be used continuously by any person for
nearly every transaction, and provide anonymity for the parties. Meanwhile,
reserve deposits are largely restricted to a limited number of entities and
2
banks. These reserve deposits are used for large-value-settlement. Howev3
er, as digitization increases, the role and form of money is changing. In response to pressure produced by the increase in new forms of money and the
potential for a cashless society, states are exploring potential substitutes to
cash. Governments have begun to investigate the intersection of digitization
4
and fiat currency: Central Bank Digital Currencies (“CBDC”).
Before discussing CBDCs, it is vital to recognize the role cash plays in
the modern financial system. The greatest attribute of cash is that it carries
5
only the information of value, protecting purchaser privacy. Cash is the only established payment system that scored “full anonymity” in the International Monetary Fund’s (“IMF”) survey on CBDC; cash protects privacy
6
because no account is required, and there is no record of transactions. Even
central banks, the issuer of legal tender fiat currency, cannot know who pos-

*
J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School (2021); B.A., University of
California, Los Angeles (2018). My sincere thanks to Professor Veronica Santarosa for helping me conceptualize this paper in 2019. I also thank Professor Adrienne Harris, Christie
Baer, and Emma Macfarlane at the Center on Finance, Law, and Policy, for the introduction
to, and insights on, this topic. Finally, I am grateful for the stellar editing and support of the
editorial staff at MJIL—of whom I would especially like to thank Alessandro Storchi for his
invaluable edits.
1.
Noriyuki Yanagawa & Hiromi Yamaoka, Digital Innovation, Data Revolution, and
Central Bank Digital Currency 2 (Bank of Japan Working Paper Series No. 19-E-2, 2019).
2.
See id.
3.
Christine Lagarde, IMF Managing Dir., Address at the Singapore Fintech Festival:
Winds of Change: The Case for a New Digital Currency 2 (Nov. 14, 2018), https:
//www.imf.org/~/media/Files/News/Speech/111418-md-sg-fintech-speech.ashx?la=en.
4.
See id. at 3 (explaining that “Various central banks around the world are seriously
considering these ideas, including Canada, China, Sweden, and Uruguay. They are embracing
change and new thinking—as indeed is the IMF.”).
5.
See G45, WORLD CASH REPORT 4 (2018).
6.
See TOMMASO MANCINI-GRIFFOLI, MARIA SOLEDAD MARTINEZ PERIA, ITAI
AGUR, ANIL ARI, JOHN KIFF, ADINA POPESCU, & CELINE ROCHON, IMF STAFF DISCUSSION
NOTE: CASTING LIGHT ON CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY 39 (Nov. 2018).
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7

sesses cash. Cash continues to be the favored payment instrument for indi8
viduals who seek anonymity in their transactions, and remains the most
9
widely used payment instrument. However, the availability of alternate
payment structures is growing; in particular, the rate at which electronic
payment transactions volumes are increasing is outpacing the rate at which
10
cash is used. In sum, this results in cash holding a progressively smaller
11
share of the payments market.
Cash, while praised for its clear compliance with international privacy
standards, is not without pitfalls. In the financial system, cash is scrutinized
for its role in money laundering and terrorist financing; the international re12
quirements for compliance in these areas are continuously evolving. Cash
13
allows for transactions with complete anonymity. Complete anonymity,
14
however, comes with trade-offs. Cash is a successful medium for illegal
15
activity, such as money laundering, terrorist financing, and tax evasion.
Importantly, the elimination of cash would increase the cost of these illicit
16
activities.
While the desire to limit money laundering and terrorist financing
through reducing the availability of cash is widely recognized as valid,
states “do not owe any customary international law obligations with respect

7.
See David Winning & James Glynn, The World’s Cash is Disappearing. Bankers
Aren’t Sure Where It Went, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2019, 4:01 PM) https://www.wsj.com
/articles/the-worlds-cash-is-disappearing-bankers-arent-sure-where-it-went-11576184491.
8.
See ECB Crypto-Assets Task Force, Crypto-Assets: Implications for Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, and Payments and Market Infrastructures (Occasional Paper Series,
No. 223/ May 2019).
9.
See G45, supra note 5, at 4.
10.
See id. at 15.
11.
See generally id. at 15.
12.
Mercy W. Buku & Michael W. Meredith, Safaricom and M-PESA in Kenya: Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity, 8 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 375, 394 (2013).
13.
Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières [“SUREF”], Do We
Need Central Bank Digital Currency? Economics, Technology, and Institutions, 2018/2
SUERF Conf. Proceedings 28 (2018).
14.
Some authors have suggested that a coordinated international regulation of money
forms that provide anonymity, such as cryptocurrencies, could assist in reducing the evasion
of sanctions, terrorist financing, and tax evasion. These proposals, however, sacrifice the international right to privacy in the process, showcasing the inherent tension between privacy
and illegal activity. See, e.g., Emma Macfarlane, Note, Strengthening Sanctions: Solutions to
Curtail the Evasion of International Economic Sanctions Through the Use of Cryptocurrency,
42 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199 (2020).
15.
See SUREF, supra note 13, at 28.
16.
See generally Emanuele Borgonovo, Stefano Caselli, Alessandra Cillo, Donato
Masciandaro & Giovanni Rabitti, Cryptocurrencies, Central Bank Digital Cash, Traditional
Money: Does Privacy Matter? 7 (Ctr. for Applied Rsc.h on Int’l Markets, Banking, Fin., and
Regul. Working Paper No. 95, 2018) (noting that “[a]mong the individuals that like the anonymity property are people who appreciate this property for illegal reasons, as an anonymous
currency can be an effective device for money laundering.”).
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to the protection of other countries’ monetary systems” aside from the duty
17
to prevent counterfeiting. This balancing between domestic legislation to
limit the channels available for illicit activities and the international requirement to protect the fundamental right to privacy creates a fundamental
tension.
Jurisdictions have begun researching and developing CBDCs to serve in
18
lieu of cash. Some central banks are analyzing the potential for a CBDC
that could be made available to the public and serve as a substitute for cash
19
by providing an alternate, safe, and robust payment instrument. The
acknowledgement by international bodies that a world without cash is imag20
inable has encouraged the development of CBDCs. However, eliminating
21
cash would undermine privacy of individuals. The creation of a CBDC in
response to the potential cashless society raises the question whether the anonymity previously provided by cash must be safeguarded by the state.
This note will conclude that a central bank in a cashless society must
opt for the token-based form of CBDC, which provides the most privacy to
individuals. States that choose an account-based CBDC will be in violation
of fundamental international privacy principles. Part I of the note will provide an overview of Central Bank Digital Currencies, drawing the crucial
distinction between account-based and token-based currencies. Part II will
establish that the broad right to privacy in the digital age is inclusive of personal financial data and elaborate on the right to privacy specifically involved by financial transactions, describing the derivation of the lawful and
arbitrary standards from article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Part III will conclude that while the lawful
standard of article 17 is not dispositive of account-based CBDCs, the relevant factors lean in favor of token-based CBDCs. The favor of token-based
CBDCs will be solidified in Part IV, where account-based CBDCs will be
shown to be arbitrary, in violation of article 17. Finally, Parts V and VI will
provide policy implications and concluding thoughts.

17.
Charles Proctor, Cryptocurrencies in International and Public Law Conceptions of
Money, in CRYPTOCURRENCIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 33, 40 (David Fox & Sarah
Green eds., 2019).
18.
See SVERIGES RIKSBANK, THE RIKSBANK’S E-KRONA PROJECT REP. 1 at 4 (2017)
(explaining that Sweden has begun to see a decline in the use of cash, but that those developments are unique from an international perspective).
19.
See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT.
INFRASTRUCTURES [“CMPI”], CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 7 (2018) https:
//www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf.
20.
See Yanagawa & Yamaoka, supra note 1 at 5; see also Raphael Auer & Rainer
Böehme, The Technology of Retail Central Bank Currency, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2020, at 85,
86–87.
21.
See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 20.

406

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 42:403

II. THE STRUCTURE OF CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES
A CBDC does not yet have a precise definition because of the wide variation in form that the instrument can take. Despite the lack of a specific
definition, a CBDC has been proposed by several sources as a “widely ac22
cessible digital form of fiat money that could be legal tender.” There are
four key factors in distinguishing a CBDC: issuer, accessibility, form, and
23
technology used.
24
First, as the name suggests, a CBDC is issued by the central bank.
Second, CBDCs can be either widely accessible to individuals similar to
cash or bank deposits, and thus meant for general purpose, or can be restricted to a limited number of financial institutions and banks, and thus
25
meant for wholesale purposes only. A general purpose CBDC is designed
to be widely accessible to households and businesses without the involve26
ment of a bank intermediary. This note will focus only on general-purpose
forms of CBDCs. The wholesale form of a CBDC is more akin in function
to central bank reserves and is outside the scope of this note. Third, the cur27
rency takes a digital form, as opposed to a physical currency such as cash.
The fourth factor, the technology employed, is the main point of divergence
28
between the different types of CBDC. There are two basic potential systems: a token-based currency, or an account-based currency.
A token-based currency is characterized by a few key distinctions that
29
allow for the provision of anonymity. First, a token-based currency would
likely utilize a cryptographic scheme that does not require user identifica30
tion. Second, the token-based currency would likely use some form of dis-

22.
See id. at 4.
23.
See Christian Barontini & Henry Holden, Proceeding with Caution—A Survey on
Central Bank Digital Currency 1 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, BIS Papers No. 101, 2019).
24.
See WORLD BANK, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY (DLT) AND BLOCKCHAIN
FINTECH NOTE NO. 1 4 (2017).
25.
See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 7.
26.
See Lael Brainard, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks on the Monetary Policy, Technology, and Globalization Panel at Monetary Policy: The Challenges Ahead,
an ECB Colloquium (Dec. 18, 2019).
27.
See Hossein Nabilou, Central Bank Digital Currencies: Preliminary Legal Observations, J. BANKING REGUL. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3329993.
28.
See Tammaro Terracciano & Luciano Somoza, Central Bank Digital Currency: The
Devil is in the Details, LSE BUS. REV. (May 26, 2020), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview
/2020/05/26/central-bank-digital-currency-the-devil-is-in-the-details/ (arguing the two key
distinctions in types of Central Bank Digital Currencies (“CBDC”) are token-based and account-based technologies, and single-tier and two-tier distribution systems).
29.
See id. (noting that in a token-based CBDC, it is technologically possible to implement a system of anonymous offline transactions).
30.
See Nabilou, supra note 27, at 17 (citing Yves Mersch, Member Executive Board
of the ECB, Digital Base Money: An Assessment from the ECB’s Perspective, Speech at the
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31

tributed ledger technology (“DLT”). DLT’s important contribution in the
formation of currency is the provision of a system that allows for trust
among anonymous participants without any need for trust across institu32
tions.
33
An account-based CBDC requires a central party—the central bank.
34
The account-based system involves a transfer of a claim on an account. In
this system, the user would request a transfer of funds between accounts
held at the central bank. The central bank would then ensure settlement, but
only after verification of authority to use the account, and authenticity of the
35
recipient’s account. Thus, the account-based system requires a much larger
exchange of information than a token-based system.
The level of anonymity associated with each of these technologies is a
36
key concern for designers of CBDC. Further, the appropriate degree of
privacy is a challenge in a digital environment and demands careful consid37
eration of public policy design choices.
Throughout the discussion of applicability of international privacy law,
it is precarious to equate CBDCs to other forms of virtual currencies because CBDCs face the unique threat of mass centralization and data collec38
tion. The CBDC’s issuer is the most impactful factor on privacy implications when compared to other virtual currencies. While CBDCs are issued
and governed by the country’s central bank, other virtual currencies are
39
governed by disparate online communities. Because CBDCs are issued by
central banks and require reliance on the central bank for full functionality,
40
large amounts of sensitive information will accumulate. In particular, in an
account-based CBDC system, all transactions of citizens will be visible to

Farewell Ceremony for Pentti Hakkarainen (Jan. 16, 2017)); Auer & Böehme, supra note 20
at 86–87.
31.
SANTIAGO FERNÁNDEZ DE LIS & JAVIER SEBASTIÁN, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL
CURRENCIES AND DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGIES 1 (2019).
32.
See WORLD BANK, supra note 24, at 2.
33.
CPMI, supra note 19, at 4
34.
See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 8.
35.
See WORLD BANK, supra note 24, at 7.
36.
See Chen Ye & Kevin C. Desouza, The Current Landscape of Central Bank Digital
Currencies, BROOKINGS (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/12
/13/the-current-landscape-of-central-bank-digital-currencies/.
37.
CPMI, supra note 19, at 10.
38.
See Tom Wilson, Explainer: Central Bank Digital Currencies—Moving Towards
Reality?, REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cenbank-digitalcurrencies-explainer/explainer-central-bank-digital-currencies-moving-towards-realityidUSKBN1ZM2JH (explaining that CBDCs are fundamentally different than cryptocurrencies
because of their status as legal tender); see also Linda M. Schilling, École Polytechnique
CREST, Speech prepared for Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee: Risks Involved with
CBDCs: On Cash, Privacy, and Information Centralization, (Oct. 29–30, 2019).
39.
See Wilson, supra note 38.
40.
See Schilling, supra note 38, at 3.
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the central bank. This system creates a greater central accumulation of sensitive information than in the current system of segmented multiple private
41
banks collecting information on customers.
While no state is yet to proffer a permanent CBDC, the idea is at the
forefront of state-based innovation across jurisdictions and multilateral insti42
tutions. A majority of central banks have begun researching CBDCs. Several central banks have begun studying the concept, and a few states have
43
undertaken pilot programs to more fully explore the idea. Overall, roughly
seventy percent of respondents to the 2018 Bank for International Settle44
ments survey reported that they were engaged in CBDC work.
The reasons driving the development and research of CBDCs vary
based on the status of the state. Developed states are investigating CBDCs
to increase payment safety and efficiency, whereas emerging market econ45
omies are creating CBDCs to facilitate financial inclusion. Crucially for
the analysis of a CBDC under the international privacy framework, some
advanced economies are motivated by the prospect of a cashless state which
46
may allow for increased public utility. Further, central banks are anticipated to be encouraged by currency forms that support “monetary policy, fi47
nancial stability, and integrity.”

III. THE BROAD RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
A. International Privacy Framework
The rise of CBDCs, and variance in technology used to create the currency, raises the question of which form, if any, may best comply with International Privacy Law standards. For example, Sweden has researched
both an account-based and a token-based e-krona and is proceeding in contracting a consulting company, Accenture, to develop the currency plan fur48
ther. The Tunisia initiative, promoted directly by the government, issued

41.
Id. at 4.
42.
See Barontini & Holden, supra note 23, at 11.
43.
See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 27; see also Yanagawa &
Yamaoka, supra note 1, at 9.
44.
See Barontini & Holden, supra note 23, at 7.
45.
See id. at 9.
46.
See Emanuele Borgonovo, Stefano Caselli, Alessandra Cillo, & Donato Masciandaro, Beyond Bitcoin and Cash: Do We Like a Central Bank Digital Currency? A Financial and
Political Economics Approach 2 (Ctr. for Applied Rsch. on Int’l Markets, Banking, Fin., &
Regul., Working Paper No. 65, 2017) (explaining that public utility of cash is disputed, as
cash has two important drawbacks: contribution to the illegal economy, and hampering monetary policy).
47.
See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 4.
48.
See generally Sayuri Shirai, Central Bank Digital Currency: Concepts and Trends,
VOX CEPR POL’Y PORTAL (Mar. 6, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/central-bank-digital-
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49

retail tokens based on a distributed ledger. These examples are not exhaustive: Uruguay and the People’s Republic of China have also piloted their
50
own unique forms of CBDCs.
The global development of CBDCs raises many legal concerns; one of
the most predominant questions is the appropriate degree of privacy that
51
should be afforded to users of the currency. International privacy law presents a set of concise, binding standards that states must take into consideration when determining what framework should regulate the issuance of a
CBDC. Privacy is a fundamental human right recognized throughout inter52
national bodies and treaties. The first modern recognition of the importance of privacy at the international level came with the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”). Article 12 of the UDHR states
that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such inter53
ference or attacks.” This first pronouncement on the right to privacy showcases that the existence of the right to privacy has been considered neces54
necessary and uncontested from the drafting of the UDHR.
The right to privacy became legally binding on states that ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Article 17
currency-concepts-and-trends (explaining that “The Riksbank has been actively considering
the first two proposals under the ‘e-krona’ project. The first, ‘account-based retail CBDC’
proposal is the issuance of a digital currency to the general public in the form of directly
providing an account at Riksbank. The second, [is the] ‘value-based retail CBDC.’”).
49.
See Sayuri Shirai, Money and Central Bank Digital Currency (Asian Dev. Bank
Inst. Working Paper No. 922, 2019), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication
/485856/adbi-wp922.pdf.
50.
See Alun John, Explainer: How Does China’s Digital Yuan Work?, REUTERS (Oct.
19, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-currency-digital-explainer/explainer-howdoes-chinas-digital-yuan-work-idUSKBN27411T; see also Marie Huillet, People’s Bank of
China Progressing Smoothly with Digital Yuan, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 6, 2020), https:
//cointelegraph.com/news/peoples-bank-of-china-progressing-smoothly-with-digital-yuan. See
generally Gerardo Licandro, Uruguayan e-Peso on the Context of Financial Inclusion (Nov.
16, 2018), https://www.bis.org/events/eopix_1810/licandro_pres.pdf.
51.
See CPMI, supra note 19, at 9–10.
52.
Compare International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter “ICCPR”], with G.A. Res. 217(III)A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter “UDHR”]. See generally PROMOTIONAL
PRODUCTS ASS’N INT’L, THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (2018), https:
//www.ppai.org/media/2941/gdpr.pdf.
53.
See UDHR, supra note 52, art. 12.
54.
The Right to Privacy and Family Life, ICE. HUM. RTS. CTR., http://www.human
rights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/human-rights-concepts-ideas-and-fora
/substantive-human-rights/the-right-to-privacy-and-family-life (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
There was no discussion debating whether or not to include the right to privacy. This indicates
a guarantee that privacy would be included in some form. See U.N. Secretary-General, Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights, ¶ 99, U.N. Doc. A
/2929 (July 1, 1955).
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of the ICCPR states that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
55
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” This binding
provision is worded almost identically to the UDHR, with the sole difference between the two being that ICCPR article 17 prohibits not only “arbi56
trary” interferences with one’s privacy, but also “unlawful” ones.

B. The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age
The existence of an internationally recognized right to privacy, coupled
with the broad interpretations promulgated in international courts, inherently acknowledges the existence of certain areas of an individual’s life that
should be outside the scope of the state. The Human Rights Committee and
regional human rights bodies interpret the right to privacy broadly through
jurisprudence, commentary, and emerging state practices. The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has held that the private sphere is “exempt from and immune to abusive or arbitrary interference or attacks” by
57
both public and private actors. Further, in Murillo v. Costa Rica, the court
noted that the scope of protection of the right to privacy has been and should
58
be interpreted in broad terms by the international human rights courts. In
Rosendo Cantu v. Mexico, the court has affirmatively described the right to
59
privacy as a “wide-ranging term, which cannot be exhaustively defined.”
The broad adaptions of the right to privacy, stemming from article 17 of the
ICCPR, suggest that the right is framed to protect a range of actions that fall
within the private sphere of an individual’s life.
60
The right to privacy includes the right to one’s person and identity.
The modern interpretation of identity includes the consideration of a per61
son’s digital identity. International organizations have warned about the
impact of experimental technology on the right to privacy. The Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe holds that the privacy of individuals

55.
ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 17.
56.
See generally Oliver Diggelmann & Maria Nicole Cleis, How the Right to Privacy
Became a Human Right, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 441, 449 (July 7, 2014).
57.
Murillo v. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 142 (Nov.
28, 2012) (explaining that the private sphere encompasses a wide range of factors associated
with individual dignity, including but not limited to the right to autonomy, development and
the right to establish and develop relationships with others, and the way the individual views
themselves).
58.
See id. ¶ 142.
59.
Rosendo Cantu v. Mexico, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, ¶ 119
(Aug. 31, 2010).
60.
See The Right to Privacy and Family Life, supra note 54.
61.
See Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [“OECD”], At a Crossroads: “Personhood”
and Digital Identity in the Information Society 7 (OECD Directorate for Science, Technology
and Industry STI Working Paper 2007/7, 2008).
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should be guaranteed “in any research project requiring the use of personal
62
data.” Our online interactions challenge the traditional notions of privacy;
as interactions using technology increase, individuals are more vulnerable to
63
breaches of privacy. These considerations of personal digital identities and
online data must be considered when determining whether an action infringes on the right to privacy.
The United Nations anticipated the inherent tension that could arise be64
tween the right to privacy and technological developments. Even in 1976,
the Human Rights Commission suggested that developing international
standards to protect the right to privacy was well within their competence,
especially considering the impact of technological developments, such as
65
recording. This discussion highlights a consensus that technology should
not be permitted to infringe on the areas of the private sphere that are exempt from interference by public and private actors.
Since the adoption of article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the United Nations has undertaken resolutions to further explain the right to privacy. In January 2014, the United Nations Gen66
eral Assembly adopted resolution 68/167. This resolution both called on
states to protect the right to privacy in the digital age and noted that international human rights law provides the structure to examine instruments’ and
67
actions’ compliance with the right to privacy. The Special Rapporteur on
the right to privacy found that while many jurisdictions committed themselves to protecting the right to privacy through the ICCPR, many of them
simultaneously put the right at risk by employing new, but incompatible,
68
technologies. This acknowledgement of the riskiness of new technologies
suggests that adoption of a CBDC could be considered an infringement if it
sufficiently interferes with the right to privacy.
Instead of putting the right to privacy at risk, the OHCHR instructs that
“privacy by design and default should be a central element for developing

62.
Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, On the Protection of Personal Data Used for
Scientific Research and Statistics, ¶ 2.1, App. to Recommendation R(83)10, (Sept. 25, 1983).
63.
See generally DEP’T PRIME MINISTER & CABINET, AUSTL., CONNECTING WITH
CONFIDENCE: OPTIMISING AUSTRALIA’S DIGITAL FUTURE 11 (2011), http://indianstrategic
knowledgeonline.com/web/connecting_with_confidence_public_discussion_paper.pdf.
64.
See Comm’n Human Rights, Rep. on the Thirtieth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4
/1116, at 10 (1976).
65.
See id.
66.
See generally G.A. Res. 68/167, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age (Jan. 21,
2014).
67.
See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. [“UNCTAD”], DATA PROTECTION
REGULATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DATA FLOWS: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT 24 (2016).
68.
See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, Right to Privacy, ¶ 8,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/63 (2019).
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69

new technologies.” Developers are instructed to identify privacy implica70
tions before and during the development process. This instruction extends
to the creators of CBDC, and charges them with the responsibility of considering the varying privacy risks between types. While the right to privacy
is not absolute, any instance of infringement must be critically examined to
determine the infringement’s compliance with minimum impairment, legit71
imacy, and proportionality.
Considering the guidance protecting the right to privacy in a digital age,
the security and privacy of an individual’s financial data should be heavily
72
scrutinized due its sensitive, and potentially valuable, nature. In analyzing
the retention of personal data, the Court of Justice of the European Union in
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister of Communications noted that the
“protection of personal data [. . .] is especially important for the right to re73
spect for private life.” The development of a CBDC would create an unprecedented aggregate of personal financial data, leading to increased vul74
nerability to cyber-attacks. The aggregation and centralization of sensitive
personal data should be monitored by the international privacy frameworks.
Currently, privacy considerations such as the restrictions on the usage of
personal financial data by third parties are applied to digital money ac75
counts. The introduction of CBDCs and supporting technology requires an
analysis of the new technical architecture to ensure privacy of financial da76
ta.

C. Testing Whether an Action Infringes on the Right to Privacy
Only a few decades ago, treaties promulgating fundamental human
rights, including the right to privacy, were not seen as an instrument in re77
solving data privacy issues. This trend has shifted: The right to privacy is
now the center of discussions surrounding data privacy. Today, article 17 of
the ICCPR is commonly viewed as providing the basis for modern data pri-

69.
See INT’L NETWORK C.L. ORG., THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE,
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL ADOPTED RESOLUTION 34/7 4 (2018).
70.
See id.
71.
See UNCTAD, supra note 67, at 24.
72.
See INT’L TELECOMM. UNION [“ITU”], REGULATORY CHALLENGES AND RISKS
FOR CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY 13 (June 2019).
73.
See Joined Cases C-293/12, C-594/12, Digit. Rts. Ir. Ltd. v. Minister of Commc’ns,
Marine, & Nat. Res. et al., ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, ¶ 53 (Apr. 8, 2014).
74.
See Schilling, supra note 38, at 4.
75.
See ITU, supra note 72, at 14.
76.
See id. (explaining the “broad social implications of digital technology necessitate
that privacy issues, including the appropriate balance between anonymity and law enforcement, should be deliberated”).
77.
See LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PRIVACY LAW: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 82
(2014).
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78

vacy law, together with the resulting jurisprudence. As such, article 17 and
its interpretation will serve as the basis for analyzing international privacy
standards for CBDCs in this note. The framework developed in article 17 of
the ICCPR determines whether there has been an infringement on the right
to privacy. Article 17 states that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence,
79
nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation.” The analysis of privacy law is conducted under the ICCPR because, as a convention, it is legal80
ly binding for signatories. Further, the ICCPR has had the strongest impact
on the national level, exerting legal order on the same governments that are
81
exploring and piloting CBDCs. The states bound by the ICCPR are bound
primarily by negative obligations, and must refrain from interfering with an
82
array of protected rights.
The language of article 17 draws a distinction between fundamental
rights that are protected only from unlawful interference, such as honor, and
rights that are protected from unlawful and arbitrary interference, such as
83
privacy. This language differs from the UDHR article 12 language, in
which the term unlawful is not present. The two key terms that qualify the
prohibited interference are then “arbitrary” and “unlawful.” When adopting
language from article 12, the ICCPR drafters chose to prohibit arbitrary interference with privacy, home, and correspondence, but eliminated the pro84
hibition on arbitrary interference on honor, which was present in article 12.
The language of article 17 shows that the drafters consciously maintained
the protection on arbitrary interference on the right to privacy, while eliminating the protection from other rights. Fundamentally, the addition of “unlawful” and maintenance on “arbitrary” suggests both terms should be given
equal weight when determining whether an instrument or act is in violation
of international privacy law.
As initially explored in Van Hulst v. Netherlands, for an interference
with the right to privacy to be “non-arbitrary,” it must satisfy a four-part
test: (1) pursuance of a legitimate aim, (2) rational connection to the legitimate aim, (3) minimal impairment to the right of privacy, and (4) proportionality between the pursuit of the legitimate aim and the limitation of the

78.
See id. at 82–84.
79.
See ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 17.
80.
See id.
81.
Christion Tomuschat, Introductory Note: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L. (2008), https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/iccpr
/iccpr.html.
82.
David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-SelfExecuting Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 138 (1999),
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1099&context=yjil.
83.
See ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 17.
84.
See UDHR, supra note 52, art. 12.
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85

right to privacy. The UN Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) released further guidance on the interpretation of article 17 through General Comment
86
16. General Comment 16 states that “[t]he introduction of the concept of
arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by
law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the
covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circum87
stances.”
Any suspected interference is subject to the arbitrary analysis, in effect
requiring the interference to pass both the four-part proportionality assessment as well as the reasonable circumstances assessment.
General Comment 16 also elaborates on the lawful requirement, clarifying that an interference on the right to privacy can only occur “on the basis
of law” that is consistent with “the provisions, aims, and objectives of the
88
covenant.” This analysis applies to both international law and domestic
89
90
law. The domestic law must be accessible and foreseeable. Further, the
91
domestic law must be precise and clearly defined. Thus, the lawfulness
standard also has, in effect, a four-part test: (1) consistency with the covenant, (2) pursuance to domestic and international law, (3) accessibility, and
(4) clear definition. All of these standards, coupled with the four-part arbitrary test, explained above, must be met in order for an infringement on the
right to privacy to be acceptable under article 17’s text.

85.
See Van Hulst v. Netherlands, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. 82d Sess., Commc’n No.
903/1999, ¶¶ 7.3, 7.6, 7.10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/903/1999 (HRC 2004); see also AM. C.
L. UNION [“ACLU”], PRIVACY RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE: A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW
GENERAL COMMENT ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER ARTICLE 17 OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 25 (2014), https:
//www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-report-iccpr-web-rel1.pdf.
86.
See generally Off. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., General Comment No. 16: Article
17 (Right to Privacy) The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence,
and Protection of Honour and Reputation, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. 1) (Apr. 8, 1988) [hereinafter General Comment 16].
87.
See id. ¶ 4.
88.
See id. ¶ 3.
89.
See ACLU, supra note 85, at 21, citing Tristán Donoso v. Panamá, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193, ¶ 56 (2009); see
also Kennedy v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26839/05, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R., 207, 253
(2010).
90.
Kennedy, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 253.
91.
Compare Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, Comments, Russian Federation, ¶ 19 U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.54 (July 26, 1995) (explaining that mechanisms to intrude into a private
communication still exist without clear legislation), with id. ¶ 31 (recommending that the relationship between bodies charged with protection of human rights be clearly defined, and that a
mechanism to ensure conformity with the convention is established).
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V. THE APPLICATION OF THE LAWFUL STANDARD TO ACCOUNT-BASED
AND TOKEN-BASED CBDCS
While both token-based and account-based CBDCs should be analyzed
under article 17, it is important to recognize that the forms present inherently different privacy risks due to the structure of the technology. The predominant distinction between account-based and token-based general purpose CBDCs is that account-based CBDCs employ intermediates to verify
the identity of the purchaser, while token-based CBDCs use tokens that are
92
verified by the receiver. Any CBDC would likely look different than a
93
permissionless, peer-to-peer model seen in currencies like Bitcoin. However, even the United States’ Federal Reserve Board recognizes that an account-based model where the central bank issues a CBDC directly to consumer accounts would raise huge legal questions, presumably concentrated
94
within the privacy framework. The central bank in an account-based system would be privy to all citizens’ financial data, allowing the central bank
95
to view sensitive transactions. While the token-based model of CBDCs
would raise considerable regulatory and policy questions, it is possible that
the issuing central bank, through applying DLT and encryption technologies, could realize anonymity in order to protect the privacy of the individu96
al consumers. The account-based CBDC presents a higher level of government interference with personal financial data, and provides the
individual with less privacy.
To test whether a general-purpose CBDC is lawful under article 17, the
currency should be evaluated on four requirements: (1) consistency with the
covenant, (2) pursuance to domestic and international law, (3) accessibility,
and (4) clear definition. The first prong holds that in whatever form it takes,
the CBDC must be consistent with the aims and goals of the ICCPR. article
17 should be read in light of General Comment 16, which provides that laws
that permit interference should be “in accordance with the provisions, aims
97
and objectives of the covenant.” When article 17 was being considered,
there was no dispute as to the principle involved because “privacy, the sanctity of the home, the secrecy of correspondence and the honour and reputation of persons were protected under the constitutions or laws of most, if not
98
all countries.”
The notion of “privacy” as included in the ICCPR was based on a
common understanding of what the potential threats to the right would be in

92.
See Barontini & Holden, supra note 23, at 11.
93.
See WORLD BANK supra note 24, at 34.
94.
See Brainard, supra note 26, at 8.
95.
Schilling, supra note 38, at 3.
96.
See Yanagawa & Yamaoka, supra note 1, at 11.
97.
General Comment 16, supra note 86, ¶ 3.
th
98.
Rep. of the 9 Sess. of the Comm’n on Hum. Rts., ¶ 67 U.N. Doc. E/2447-E/CN.4
/689 (June 6, 1953).
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1966. Digital currencies were not known in 1966; the concept of a secure
99
digital currency has been theorized only since the 1980s. In the 1960s, the
international ratios of physical fiat currency in circulation to nominal GDP
100
was at its peak. Thus, article 17 was drafted in a global economy in which
payment privacy was not questioned, as cash provided a widespread way to
transact anonymously. Further, there is no mention of payment systems in
the ICCPR. While the authors considered the ability to make payments for
101
other purposes, they did not elaborate on any particular right relating to
consumer payments or finance. CBDCs do not fall explicitly within the aims
or goals of the covenant. A payment system that risks consumer privacy in
some forms is at fundamental tension with the understanding of anonymity
102
in payments at the time the framers drafted the covenant. An accountbased CBDC is tied to an identity system; from a technological perspective,
103
this eliminates privacy and requires identification of the user. Choosing a
system that discards payment privacy, especially in a cashless society, is not
consistent with the aims of the covenant.
The second prong of the lawfulness standard requires the action to be
pursuant to both domestic and international law. An understanding of the
restriction on “unlawful” activities reflects an understanding that an action,
104
even if not arbitrary, must still be envisaged by law. For an action or instrument to be pursuant to both domestic and international law, there must
not be a more-narrow, less-intrusive way of reasonably achieving the same

99.
See generally DAVID CHAUM, BLIND SIGNATURES FOR UNTRACEABLE PAYMENTS
(1982), http://www.hit.bme.hu/~buttyan/courses/BMEVIHIM219/2009/Chaum.BlindSigFor
Payment.1982.PDF (this paper is considered one of the first proposals of a digital currency in
history).
100.
See John Bagnall, David Bounie, Kim P. Huynh, Anneke Kosse, Tobias Schmidt,
Scott Schuh, & Helmut Stix, Consumer Cash Usage: A Cross-Country Comparison with
Payment Diary Survey Data, INT’L J. CENT. BANKING, Dec. 2016, at 1.
101.
See ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 14. ICCPR article 14(d) makes the only statement
pertaining to finance or payments within the ICCPR: “Everyone shall be entitled. . . to defend
himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing. . . to have legal assistance
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by
him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it.” (emphasis added).
102.
Diggelman & Cleis supra note 56, at 451 (“In the third committee of the General
Assembly, the discussions focused on the relationship between the protection of privacy in
general, the family and the home.); see Andrea Ryan, Gunnar Trumbull & Peter Tufano, A
Brief Postwar History of U.S. Consumer Finance, 85 BUS. HIST. REV. 461, 463 (2011) (explaining that even in the U.S., less than a decade before the ICCPR was drafted, “nearly all
payment activity. . . was paper based: essentially cash, checks and money orders.” This would
have been the status quo for the drafters.)
103.
Auer & Böehme, supra note 20, at 86–87.
104.
See BYGRAVE, supra note 77, at 92 (arguing that under ECHR Article 8(2), commonly read as the affirmative obligations that complement the ICCPR prohibitions, there must
be a legal basis for the interference. The legal basis can be statutory, found in rules, or judicially developed).
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105

results available to the government. Further, as shown in Kononov v. Latvia, conduct must be analyzed under both the domestic and applicable international law; it cannot be analyzed merely on the more favorable stand106
ard.
On a global scale, domestic privacy laws vary widely; much of this discrepancy depends on whether a national society tends towards modern indi107
vidualism or towards collectivism. Due to the divergence between states,
it is beyond the scope of this note to determine whether a CBDC, tokenbased or account-based, is explicitly permitted by domestic law in each jurisdiction. State entities may not look at protected information directly, but
rather monitor, collect, and store mass amounts of personal data indefinite108
ly. Even this moderate approach impacts the privacy of individuals by allowing governments to access significant amounts of data that otherwise
109
would not exist.
On an international scale, the systemic public collection of personal data can fall within the scope of private life protected by article 17 when it “is
110
systemically collected and stored in files held by the authorities.” As noted by the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, states are risking their
compliance with article 17 by implementing new, more invasive technolo111
gies. Though account-based CBDCs are likely not explicitly prohibited in
domestic legislation, the concept behind the technology would permit the
central bank to use an owner register, essentially allowing for full transparency of the amount of money in each account, as well as the amount and re112
cipient of money transfers. A token-based CBDC, while dependent on the
technology used in each state, has the potential to allow for peer-to-peer
transfers, similar to cash, without the oversight or easily identifiable ac113
counts of a central bank clearing house. Though storing personal data
alone does not violate article 17, it does risk running afoul of the European
105.
See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION [“EFF”], NECESSARY &
PROPORTIONATE: INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW TO COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE 20 (May 2014), https://www.ohchr.org
/Documents/Issues/Privacy/ElectronicFrontierFoundation.pdf.
106.
See Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 36376/04, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 232–244
(2010).
107.
See generally Gerard Roland & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Understanding the Individualism-Collectivism Cleavage and Its Effects: Lessons from Cultural Society, in INSTITUTIONS
AND COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 213 (Masahiko Aoki, Timur Kuran, & Gerard
Roland eds., 2012).
108.
See EFF, supra note 105, at 7.
109.
See id.
110.
See Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 43, (2000) (also explaining that there is no reason of principle to justify excluding activities of a professional or
business nature from the notion of “private life.”).
111.
See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, supra note 68, ¶ 8.
112.
See Shirai, supra note 49.
113.
See Terracciano & Somoza, supra note 28.
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Court of Justice’s proposition to give personal financial data the utmost privacy, and the European Court of Human Rights’ intention to preserve a pri114
vate identity in spite of modern technology.
However, the analysis of lawfulness does not end with a simple allowance of infringement by law; rather, the application of the law on the specific instance of infringement on privacy must also be reasonably foreseeable
and “detail the precise circumstances in which such interferences may be
115
permitted.” Individuals must be able to discern from the language of the
law the “circumstances in which and conditions on which public authorities
116
are entitled” to breach the right to privacy. Further, states that are signatories to the ICCPR not only have the responsibility to detail permissible interferences, but also have the affirmative obligation to “undertake the necessary steps to adopt laws or other measures. . . as may be necessary to give
117
effect” to the right to privacy. Currently, mandates permitting the creation
of a CBDC are not widespread. As of 2017, roughly twenty-five percent of
central banks have the legal authority through their domestic mandates to
issue a CBDC, thirty-three percent do not have the legal authority to do so,
and the remainder of central banks are unsure as to the legality of an issu118
ance. The widespread lack of certain legal authority presents a large hurdle for central banks; if laws permitting infringement of privacy must detail
the precise circumstances in which interferences may be allowed, and financial data should be afforded a high degree of privacy, there must be explicit
detailed authorization to infringe on the anonymity of payments. Further,
the General Assembly Resolution on the Right to Privacy requires ICCPR
signatories to affirmatively shape legislation to protect individuals’ rights
119
recognized in the covenant. For the central banks without a current legal
mandate to issue a CBDC, any legislation constructing a mandate would
have to protect the right to privacy in order to be consistent with the jurisdiction’s international obligations. Again, account-based CBDCs, when
compared to token-based systems, give rise to less anonymity and less pri120
vacy.

114.
See Joined Cases C-293/12, C-594/12, Digit. Rts. Ir. Ltd. v. Minister of Commc’ns,
Marine, & Nat. Res. et al., ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 (Apr. 8, 2014); see also Malone v. United
Kingdom, App. No 8691/79, 1984 Eur. Ct. H.R. (explaining that The Convention protects the
community of men; man in our times has a need to preserve his identity, to refuse the total
transparency of society, to maintain the privacy of his personality).
115.
General Comment 16, supra note 86, ¶ 8; see also Van Hulst v. Netherlands, U.N.
Hum. Rts. Comm. 82d Sess., Commc’n No. 903/1999, ¶¶ 7.3, 7.6, 7.10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C
/82/D/903/1999 (HRC 2004).
116.
See Taylor-Sabori v. United Kingdom, App. No. 47114/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. 4 (2002).
117.
See ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 2.
118.
See Barontini & Holden, supra note 23, at 12.
119.
G.A. Res. 69/166, U.N. Doc. A/RES/69/166, at 4 (Dec. 18, 2014).
120.
See Terracciano & Somoza, supra note 28.

Winter 2021]

The Privacy Cost of Currency

419

V. THE APPLICATION OF THE ARBITRARY STANDARD TO ACCOUNTBASED AND TOKEN-BASED CBDCS
A. Overview of the Standard
While the lawfulness standard of article 17 does not provide a solidified
answer to the question of legality of account-based or token-based CBDCs,
the analysis does not end with the “unlawful” provision. Rather, the drafters
121
of the ICCPR included both an unlawful and an arbitrariness standard. As
anticipated above, the arbitrary standard is often argued to have four prongs,
the instrument must: (1) pursue a legitimate aim, (2) have a rational connection to that aim, (3) minimally impair the right to privacy, and (4) strike a
122
fair balance between the pursuit of the aim and the limitation of the right.
Further, the introduction of the arbitrariness standard is intended to serve as
a limit on the lawfulness standard; conduct that may be acceptable under international and domestic law may still be deemed to infringe on the right to
123
privacy if it does not meet the four factor test. Thus, in addition to being
considered lawful, any introduction of a CBDC needs to satisfy all four factors.

B. Pursuance of a Legitimate Aim
The CBDC, whether in account-based or token-based form, must be
created to pursue a legitimate aim; this factor is easily satisfied in most cases. Generally, emerging market economies have stronger motivations to de124
velop a CBDC compared to advanced economies. However, both types of
economies list motivations for creating a CBDC as factors such as financial
stability, monetary policy implementation, financial inclusion, domestic
payments efficiency, cross-border payments efficiency, and payment safe-

121.
See generally ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 17.
122.
See ACLU, supra note 85, at 24. The gist of this four-factor test is widely accepted,
but occasionally is phrased differently. For example, in Tristán Donoso v. Panamá, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193, ¶ 56
(2009), the Inter-American Court held that restrictions on privacy “must be statutorily enacted, serve a legitimate purpose, and meet the requirements of suitability, necessity, and proportionality which render it necessary in a democratic society.” The “statutorily enacted” requirement is directly analogizable to the lawfulness standard, the “legitimate purpose” to the
legitimate aim, the “suitability” to the rational connection, the “necessity” to the minimal impairment, and the “proportionality” to the fair balance.
123.
See General Comment 16, supra note 86, ¶ 4; see also Van Hulst v. Netherlands,
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. 82d Sess., Commc’n No. 903/1999, ¶¶ 7.3, 7.6, 7.10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/82/D/903/1999 (HRC 2004).
124.
See CODRUTA BOAR, HENRY HOLDEN, & AMBER WADSWORTH, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, BIS PAPERS NO. 107: IMPENDING ARRIVAL—A SEQUEL TO THE SURVEY ON
CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY 1 (Jan. 2019).
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125

ty. Digitization of money has its roots in historical progression; from
coins for local commerce to checks for long distance, the evolution of mon126
ey has been centered around rightful ownership and trust. The evolving
form of money is expected to maintain legitimacy and traceable ownership,
while at the same time becoming more user-friendly, readily available, safe,
127
and protected against crime and invasion of privacy. The evolution of a
CBDC promulgated by a central bank fits into the historical narrative of the
expectations of currency, as factors such as payment safety and financial inclusion facilitate a readily available, safe currency; this suggests the aims of
creating a CBDC are legitimate under article 17.

C. Rationally Connected to the Legitimate Aim
Further, the issuance of both token and account-based CBDCs are rationally connected to the various goals suggested by central banks. CBDC
has attracted interest for its proposed ability to address challenges identified
by central bankers, such as “financial inclusion, payments efficiency, and
128
payment system operational and cyber resilience.” Further, the implementation of a CBDC would provide an instrument to pursue rational policy
goals such as anti-money laundering, know your customer, and reduction of
tax evasion, though these areas are not frequently the primary goal of the
129
central bank. Both account-based and token-based CBDCs can be created
to pursue a legitimate aim, and can be rationally connected to that aim. The
first two prongs of the arbitrary standard are not in contention.

D. Minimal Impairment on the Right to Privacy
Although CBDCs are not prohibited on the basis of lawfulness or legitimacy alone, the application of the remainder of the arbitrary standard raises

125.
Id. at 4. Most of these factors apply in varying degrees based on the development of
the respondent economy. For example, domestic payment efficiency and financial inclusion
were rated as “very important” for emerging market economies, whereas payment safety was
rated as “very important” for advanced economies. Cross border payment efficiency is the
most important for advanced economies researching a wholesale CBDC, but is outside the
scope of this note; see also BANK OF CANADA, MONETARY AUTH. OF SINGAPORE, AND BANK
OF ENGLAND, CROSS-BORDER INTERBANK PAYMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS: EMERGING
OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION (2019).
126.
See Lagarde, supra note 3, at 2.
127.
Id.
128.
WORLD ECON. F. [“WEF”], CENTRAL BANKS AND DISTRIBUTED LEDGER
TECHNOLOGY: HOW ARE CENTRAL BANKS EXPLORING BLOCKCHAIN TODAY? 4 (2019); but
see WALTER ENGERT & BEN S.C. FLUNG, BANK OF CANADA, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL
CURRENCY: MOTIVATIONS AND IMPLICATION (2017) (where increasing competition in payments and financial stability are considered to be sound motivations for issuing a CBDC, financial inclusion can be legitimate reasoning, but reducing effective lower bound on interest
rates and inhibiting criminal activity are not legitimate aims for issuance).
129.
See WEF, supra note 128, at 9.
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the largest, and potentially detrimental, hurdles for account-based CBDCs,
especially in a cashless society. Prong three of the arbitrary interference test
requires states to choose the infringement that has minimal impairment on
privacy. An account-based CBDC would not “minimally impair” the right
to privacy because the centralized structure requires reliance on the central
bank to act as the central node. The use of a central node amplifies the
amount of information a state could access and would minimize the amount
130
of privacy a consumer would be able to choose. The imposition of a minimal impairment standard implies that encroachment on privacy must not be
merely useful to the state, but rather there is a direct and immediate nexus
131
between the legitimate aim and the remedy suggested. Further, even actions taken in accordance with a legitimate aim can be found to violate international privacy guidelines when there is no adequate guarantee against
132
abuse. While there are a wide variety of approaches to issuance of a
CBDC, it is possible to use distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) in a token-based system to settle peer to peer transactions, eliminating the need for
133
a central record-keeper. Using DLT in this way could enable central banks
to issue a token-based CBDC that would not require central bank interference for settlement. A token-based system would limit the amount of information available to the government when compared to the account-based
system, and act similarly to the role of cash. Because of the availability of a
less intrusive alternative, an account-based system likely does not satisfy the
minimal impairment standard.
While state actors benefit from a wide scope of deference to the means
chosen for achieving the legitimate aim, deference will not be given to eve134
ry instance of impairment. CBDCs present a clear occasion of multiple
discrete forms of infringement achieving similar results, with strikingly different privacy implications. In a token-based system, user A could send the
CBDC from their wallet, through a decentralized system, to user B’s wal135
let. Many systems utilizing DLT rely on the identification of the token being transferred as legitimate, rather than rely on the identification of the

130.
Schilling, supra note 38, at 3.
131.
See Brief of Amici Curiae, United Nations Human Rights Experts in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal, John Doe (Kidane) v. The Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia, No. 16-7081 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 1, 2016).
132.
See Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, Decision on Admissibility,
Eur. Ct. H. R., ¶ 106 (June 29, 2006).
133.
See CPMI, supra note 19, at 8.
134.
See generally Weber, App. No. 54934/00 supra note 132, ¶ 80 (interferences must
not only have a legitimate aim, but must also be justified, and be necessary in a democratic
society in order to achieve those aims).
135.
See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 8 (however, the ledger where the
token is sent could also be centralized, and thus lack the anonymity in the described example).
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136

sender or recipient. These systems are similar to cash, in that the transfer
137
of value is decentralized and does not require a central clearing party. In
contrast, in an account-based system, the payor must be identified as the
138
proper owner of the account from which the transaction is being sent. The
distinction between these two systems is one of central bank control and
amount of anonymity. The account-based system could permit the central
bank to view all transactions of account holders, whereas the token-based
139
system can be designed to mitigate these privacy concerns.
Further, even if a central bank were to consider the minimal impairment
standard, central banks would have no individual incentives to issue a
CBDC that would transfer anonymously with validation by distributed ledg140
er technology. Doing so would weaken their role as a regulator or super141
visory body. The current proposals for CBDC are generally not for media
that circulates anonymously peer-to-peer, but rather for a central clearing
142
system. A leading cryptocurrency critic, Roubini, acknowledges that the
currency central banks are envisaging issuance of would rely on a centralized system, with a single ledger, available to every individual in the econ143
omy, thereby avoiding any situation with private transactions. This system
could dominate not only cash deposits, but also alternative payment systems
such as PayPal or Square, because the rational consumer would not pay
even a small fee for payment transfer services provided by the central bank
144
for free. In effect, the central bank’s ability to enhance their own role in
the payment infrastructure by creating a system where all payments go

136.
Charles Kahn, Francisco Rivadeneyra & Tsz-Nga Wong, Should the Central Bank
Issue e-Money? (Working Paper 2019-003A, January 2019), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org
/6475/78020ed229bdce9ee5a3a12d4c1d85b15c6d.pdf.
137.
See id. at 3–4.
138.
Id. at 8.
139.
Schilling, supra note 38, at 3.
140.
Nouriel Roubini, Keynote Speech at BEF Davos: Fintech Revolution Coming,
Nothing To Do With Blockchain (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=97ke
NLmxP0c.
141.
See generally Tobias Adrian & Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, Central Bank Digital
Currencies: 4 Questions and Answers, IMFBLOG (Dec. 12, 2019), https://blogs.imf.org/2019
/12/12/central-bank-digital-currencies-4-questions-and-answers/ (a central bank that choses to
issue a CBDC would be responsible for “potentially including interfacing with customers,
building front-end wallets, picking and maintaining technology, monitoring transactions, and
being responsible for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.” A
CBDC that transfers anonymously would be more difficult to monitor, leading to potential
reputational risk.).
142.
See Lawrence White, Efficient “Central Bank Digital Currency” is a Fantasy,
CATO INST., (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.cato.org/blog/efficient-central-bank-digitalcurrency-fantasy.
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See Roubini, supra note 140.
144.
See id. (on an international scale, this critique would apply to systems such as
Alipay in China, M-Pesa in Kenya, and so on).
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through a central bank clearinghouse could squeeze out more anonymous
payment systems. The elimination of more anonymous payment systems
would minimally impair the right to privacy.
Past examples of regulatory abuse showcase why an account-based
CBDC in a cashless society could be disastrous for the international right to
privacy. For example, in the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation worked to decline banking services to lawfully operating busi145
nesses such as payday lenders. In order to accomplish this goal, the government agencies had to pressure banks to cut off banking relationships with
146
the targeted companies. Crucially, paper notes remained an option for do147
ing business if the legal entity was denied a bank account. However, if
this regulatory abuse reoccurred in a cashless economy, the regulators could
make it impossible for legal businesses to process payments as there would
be no anonymous alternative. Instead of relying on pressuring private enti148
ties, the authorities could directly monitor and shut down retail accounts,
149
halting any access to currency. The least restrictive measure to protect a
legitimate aim should not have the potential to stunt various industries, lead150
ing to potential collapses of entire businesses. Account-based CBDCs un-

145.
For a deeper understanding of Operation Choke Point, see Nobert Michel, Newly
Unsealed Documents Show Top FDIC Officials Running Operation Choke Point, FORBES,
(Nov. 5, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/norbertmichel/2018/11/05/newlyunsealed-documents-show-top-fdic-officials-running-operation-choke-point/#640a8f721191.
The FDIC targeted businesses that “have been understood by industry and financial regulators
as being subject to complex or varying legal and regulatory environments (such as activities
that may be legal only in certain states); being prohibited for certain consumers (such as minors); being subject to varying state and federal licensing and reporting regimes; or tending to
display a higher incidence of consumer complaints, returns, or chargebacks.” FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP. OFF. OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, REPORT NO. AUD 15-008 THE FDIC’S ROLE IN
OPERATION CHOKE POINT AND SUPERVISORY APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONS THAT
CONDUCTED BUSINESS WITH MERCHANTS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH-RISK ACTIVITIES 2–3
(2015).
146.
See Dennis Shaul, There’s No Downplaying the Impact of Operation Choke Point,
AM. BANKER (Nov. 28, 2018, 10:39 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/theresno-downplaying-the-impact-of-operation-choke-point.
147.
The availability of an anonymous source of transactions remains important for legal
business on a statewide scale, such as the Marijuana Banking Sector. See MICHAEL S. BARR,
HOWELL E. JACKSON, & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND
POLICY 182 (2d ed., 2017).
148.
See CENT. BANK DIGIT. CURRENCIES WORKING GRP., KEY ASPECTS AROUND
CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES POLICY 19 (2019) (explaining the potential for regulatory abuse by authorities, “central banks could be called upon to provide CBDC users’ data to
tax and other authorities (e.g. for judicial matters)”).
149.
I would like to thank Professor Lawrence H. White for his insights and guidance on
this paper, specifically as it relates to Operation Choke Point.
150.
See Ben Emmerson, Special Rapporteur, Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/69/397, ¶ 18
(Sept. 23, 2014) (promulgating the least intrusive principle, which holds the “measure chosen
be the least intrusive instrument among those which might achieve the desired result.”).
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dertaken in a cashless society would be privy to this type of abuse without
guaranteeing adequate safeguards, and thus would impair the right to priva151
cy.

E. Proportionality of the Pursuit of the Aim and the Limitation of the
Right
Finally, any potential infringement promulgated by the state must be
analyzed under a proportionality test, comparing the balance between the
pursuit of an aim and the limitation of the right. When any restriction is
made that infringes on a fundamental right, states must only undertake efforts that “are proportionate to the pursuance of legitimate aims in order to
ensure continuous and effective protection of Covenant rights [. . .]. In no
case may the restrictions be applied or invoked in a manner that would im152
pair the essence of a covenant right.” For states that pursue a CBDC as an
alternative to cash as physical currency use dwindles or becomes unavailable due to exigent circumstances, the argument to proportionally limit privacy may exist, as having some form of currency is necessary for individuals to make transactions. However, states that adopt a CBDC for alternate
reasons, such as preference for less cash or better compliance with countering-the-financing-of-terrorism (“CFT”) regulations, are likely in violation of
the proportionality standard of article 17.
Countries that face a bona fide currency access crisis may have more
153
demanding, legitimate state aims in issuing a CBDC; these higher stakes
aims may allow slightly more limitation on the right to privacy but never a
154
complete limitation. For example, in states such as the Republic of Marshall Islands, where the population risks being cut off from the financial
155
system completely due to geographic and economic constraints, the need
for some widely accessible form of currency is apparent. However, any
form of currency must not only serve a permissible purpose, but also allow
156
for the maximum amount of privacy to be maintained. Although currency
presents a special consideration of bulk collection of personal transaction
data, an individual must have a method of purchasing power to be an active
participant in the economy. Concerns have already been raised about the
151.
See Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, Decision on Admissibility,
Eur. Ct. H. R., ¶ 106 (June 29, 2006).
152.
Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., General Comment No. 31, the Nature of
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc.
31CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, (May 26, 2004) (emphasis added) [hereinafter General Comment 31].
153.
See Ye & Desouza, supra note 36.
154.
See Emmerson, supra note 150, ¶ 19.
155.
IMF, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Selected Issues, IMF Country Rep. No. 18
/271, at 3, 10 (2018) (explaining that while some do not agree the SOV is a CBDC, it is not
disputed that access to traditional banking is minimal).
156.
See General Comment 31, supra note 152, ¶¶ 11–16.
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ability of the state to access data in the first place, and subsequently share it
157
among different parts of the state. Should states eliminate physical fiat
currency and issue a CBDC, governments would have unparalleled access
to financial transactions, bypassing the first concern of access to the data.
Thus, the risk of violating the proportionality constraint in this instance is
striking: While populations undeniably need currency for reasons such as
financial inclusion, the anonymity offered by cash is vital in maintaining the
least invasive solution to the right to privacy. In jurisdictions where access
158
to cash is threatened, CBDCs may be a viable solution. However, in order
to comply with both the least intrusive instrument and proportionality standards, states must adopt CBDCs that do not completely demolish anonymity
in payments.
Alternatively, other states are motivated to promulgate a CBDC due to
an unwanted “high reliance on cash. . . and improving know-your-customer
and countering-the-financing-of-terrorism (“KYC”/”CFT”) arrange159
ments.” This motivation ultimately violates international privacy law if
the CBDC does not have privacy safeguards and is issued in lieu of cash.
States are permitted to infringe on the article 17 right to privacy for certain
legitimate aims. However, the former special rapporteur explicitly affirmed
that “countering terrorism is not a trump card which automatically legiti160
mates interferences with the right to privacy.” The policy goals of enhancing KYC and CFT are a microcosm of the classical tradeoffs in record161
keeping systems between access, privacy, and security. Issuing a CBDC
represents an attempt at achieving perfect security, inevitably sacrificing
consumer privacy. The tradeoff between access and privacy is analogizable
162
to the type of system being utilized. Proponents of issuing a CBDC for
KYC or CFT purposes tend to rely on the model of an account-based cur163
rency. However, the account-based system requires the central clearing
164
party to verify each transaction, leading to mass surveillance of every
transfer. In a system without an option for receiver verification (i.e., without
token-based digital currencies), utilizing a CBDC to increase KYC or CFT
policy goals represents a disproportionate infringement of privacy.
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Fred H. Cate, James X. Dempsey & Ira S. Rubenstein, Systemic Government Access to Private-Sector Data, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 198 (2012).
158.
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159.
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160.
Martin Scheinin, Special Rapporteur, The Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with Countering Terrorism, ¶ 13 U.N. Doc A/HRC/13/37
(2009).
161.
See generally Kahn et al., supra note 136, at 9.
162.
See generally id.
163.
See generally SRIRAM DARBHA & RAKESH ARORA, BANK OF CANADA, PRIVACY
IN CBDC TECHNOLOGY, STAFF ANALYTICAL NOTE 2020-09 (June 2020).
164.
See Kahn et al., supra note 136, at 9.
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Ultimately, due to the least restrictive infringement principle and the
requirement that any infringement be proportionate, the use of an accountbased CBDC in a cashless society is in violation of international privacy
law. While infringing on privacy through the promulgation of CBDCs can165
not be summarily condemned, the existence of anonymous means of
payment provides a critical channel for individuals to choose to protect their
digital life from mass data collection. Additionally, the existence of a tokenbased CBDC, where tokens can be verified by the recipient rather than a
central clearing house, suggests that account-based CBDCs are not the least
restrictive infringement on privacy in many, if not all, cases. Finally, while
certain policy aims may be regarded as lawful and legitimate, the complete
mass interference with privacy in payments strongly suggests a disproportionate outcome.

PART V: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The token-based model, discussed throughout the paper, can prevail on
166
privacy concerns when designed to maintain anonymity in payments. Unfortunately for the implementation of CBDC technology, decentralized to167
kens will cost a magnitude more than alternate models. Many central
banks are in the investigative stage and do not plan to immediately issue a
168
CBDC; this delayed timeline suggests that a potential solution to avoid
violating international privacy laws is to wait until the decentralized token
technology is widespread and developed enough to offset the greater cost of
verification. By delaying the introduction of a CBDC model, states may be
able to avoid having to make the choice between privacy, security, and access.
Further, if states choose to pursue a CBDC, central banks should recognize the fundamental tension between international privacy laws and central
bank incentives. Central banks may lack incentive, besides compliance with
international privacy laws, to issue a digital currency that would be validat169
ed by a distributed ledger system and circulate anonymously. Due to this
lack of incentive, central banks should take specific note of the balance of
the pursuit of the aim and the limitation on the right to privacy and cautiously approach CBDCs with the goal of preserving access to anonymous payment methods. Importantly, individual consumers value anonymity in cur-

165.
See Emmerson, supra note 150, ¶ 7 (reasoning that an assessment of the legality
and proportionality of surveillance measures must be undertaken using a case by case basis).
166.
See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 11.
167.
See Sarah Allen, James Grimmelmann, Ari Juels, & Eswar Prasad, Design Choices
for Central Bank Digital Currency, BROOKINGS (July 23, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu
/blog/up-front/2020/07/23/design-choices-for-central-bank-digital-currency/ (explaining that
while there are cryptographic systems to maintain privacy, they are complex and costly).
168.
See generally Barontini & Holden, supra note 23, at 7–8.
169.
See White, supra note 142.
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170

rency. Previous attempts to digitize payments on a state to individual basis
have already raised many concerns in states such as Australia and represent
the extension of government regulation into personal autonomy and private
171
life.

PART VI: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
As technology progresses, central banks are not only presented with
more options on how to pursue currency, but also must consider the best op172
tions in light of international standards protecting the right to privacy. Article 17 of the ICCPR creates an external limit on the innovation of CBDCs,
as Central Banks themselves may not have an incentive to pursue the most
anonymous form of currency. Article 17 imposes two umbrella standards to
consider for any potential infringement of privacy: lawfulness and arbitrariness. The four-part test to determine whether an infringement on privacy is
lawful is: (1) consistency with the covenant, (2) pursuant to domestic and
international law, (3) accessibility, and (4) clearly defined. The four-part
test to determine whether an infringement on privacy is arbitrary is: (1) pursuance of a legitimate aim, (2) rational connection to the legitimate aim, (3)
minimal impairment to the right of privacy, and (4) proportionality between
the pursuit of the legitimate aim and the limitation of the right to privacy.
Proposed CBDCs should be analyzed under article 17 because of the
sensitive nature of the mass aggregation of financial data. In particular,
states that are moving towards a cashless society, whether involuntarily or
voluntarily, must not eliminate the ability to transact and make payments
anonymously. Central banks that choose to experiment with CBDCs should
ensure that their currencies are lawful and not arbitrary. Crucially, under the
arbitrary infringement analysis, the CBDC must minimally impair privacy
and must not infringe on privacy more than they pursue a legitimate policy
goal. All aspects considered of both the arbitrary and lawfulness tests, token-based CBDCs present the option for a more anonymous alternative to
physical fiat payment when compared to the account-based CBDC alternative. Though the anonymity of cash is difficult to replicate, a token-based
system provides for a peer-to-peer transfer system that does not require the
approval or aggregation of personal financial data in a central clearinghouse. Ultimately, the account-based CBDC violates international privacy
standards due to the development of the token-based alternative that inherently intrudes less on the right to privacy.
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